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Divorce Reform: Pennsylvania Attempts to
Break with the Past
I. INTRODUCTION
In the past ten years, few areas of the law have been the subject of
such criticism and modernization as that dealing with divorce or
divorce related issues.' Since the institution of no-fault grounds in
California in 1969,2 state after state has reformed its divorce law to
better deal with contemporary family problems.3 This change was war-
ranted not only by the enormous increase in the divorce rate,4 with the
corresponding additional burden on the courts, but more specifically,
by the realization that the procedure which most states utilized prior
to 1969-the fault system'-was having disasterous effects on the
spouses, their families, and the judicial system.' Nevertheless, Penn-
1. See, e.g., Cannell, Abolish Fault-Oriented Divorce in Ohio-As a Service to
Society and to Restore Dignity to the Domestic Relations Court, 4 AKRON L. REV. 92
(1971); Clark, Divorce Policy and Divorce Reform, 42 U. COLO. L. REv. 403 (1977); Gold-
stein & Gitter, On Abolition of Grounds for Divorce: A Model Statute and Commentary,
3 FAM. L.Q. 75 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Goldstein & Gitter]; Note, Are Fault Re-
quirements in Divorce Actions Unconstitutional?, 16 J. FAM. L. 265 (1977).
2. CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970).
3. As of January 1, 1980, only Illinois, Pennsylvania and South Dakota had failed to
adopt some type of no-fault provision.
4. In 1910, 948,000 marriages and 83,000 divorces were recorded in the United
States. Preliminary figures for 1978 show that the rate has increased to 2,243,000 mar-
riages and 1,122,00 divorces. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 60 (100th ed. 1979). Pennsylvania began recording
divorces in 1944, and found in that year that 10,320 divorces were granted and 62,412
marriages were performed. In 1978 the divorce statistic had risen to 38,261 and marriages
had climbed to 92,682. BUREAU OF HEALTH DATA SYSTEMS, PA. DEPT. OF HEALTH, PENN-
SYLVANIA MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, 1978, at 3, 29 (1979) [hereinafter cited as PA.
MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS].
5. The "fault system" refers to those systems which require that the moving party
prove that the other spouse was guilty of some marital misconduct (fault) which would
justify the granting of a divorce. "No-fault" does not require this finding of fault. Most no-
fault statutes consist of one or a combination of the following: (1) the court determines
that the marriage is dead; (2) the spouses agree that the marriage is dead; (3) after living
separate and apart for a required statutory period, one spouse may unilaterally terminate
the marriage. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970); MISs. CODE ANN. § 93-5-2
(Supp. 1979); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 34-2 (West Supp. 1979).
6. See notes 64-77 and accompanying text infra.
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sylvania remained steadfast in permitting a divorce to be granted only
upon a showing of fault of one of the spouses.
In Pennsylvania, as in the other forty-nine states, divorce is a
creature of statute. Although only the courts can grant a divorce, the
sole grounds for doing so are defined by the legislature.! The power to
terminate a marriage and to establish the grounds by which a mar-
riage could be dissolved has been upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power of the states.9 Until recently, a divorce could be granted
in Pennsylvania only when one or more of the following ten grounds
had been proven: impotency, bigamy, adultery, desertion, cruelty, in-
dignities, fraud, conviction of certain crimes, marrying within the pro-
hibited degrees of consanguinity or affinity, and insanity."
The state's overriding interest in protecting the public welfare-by
encouraging family stability-has been the argument most often
asserted in defense of the fault system in Pennsylvania." The fault
system makes divorces difficult to obtain," and it at least theoretically
follows that the marriage and the family are protected. However, this
defense fails to view the marital relationship realistically. It erroneously
assumes that if no fault can be shown a working marriage exists, and if
a marriage is not working it is due to the fault of one of the spouses.'3
Furthermore, the vitality of this defense seems to wane when analysis
focuses upon the serious problems generated by the fault system. Not
only does the system tend to foster perjury on the part of the parties
to the divorces, 4 but it also encourages both migratory divorces" and
disdain for the judicial system." Perhaps the most significant draw-
back of such a system, however, is that it intensifies the ill feelings
between the two spouses not only at the time of the divorce itself, but
in the future as well. 7
These problems have not gone unnoticed by Pennsylvania's
legislators. Numerous attempts have been made in the past years to
7. See PA. CONST. art. 3, § 32 (prohibits special laws). See also Darcy v. Darcy, 197
Pa. Super. Ct. 100, 176 A.2d 919 (1962); Lannamann v. Lannamann, 171 Pa. Super. Ct. 147
89 A.2d 897 (1952).
8. For the various grounds for divorce that existed in Pennsylvania prior to the
enactment of the new Divorce Code of 1980, see PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 10 (Purdon 1955
& Supp. 1979). See also text accompanying note 10 infra.
9. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
10. See note 8 supra.
11. See note 81 and accompanying text infra.
12. See notes 61-62 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text infra.
14. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 79-80.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 81.
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reform the divorce law, but all have proved unsuccessful.18 On April 2,
1980, however, a divorce reform provision was finally signed into law,
thus becoming the first major change in Pennsylvania's divorce law in
nearly two hundred years. 9 Although the new Divorce Code definitely
improves this area of family law by easing the pain and inequities
which had become inherent in the old divorce law, it is by no means
the best possible solution. This comment will analyze the new Divorce
Code. Its weak points will be exposed and possible improvements sug-
gested. Attention will be given to the grounds for divorce, which in-
clude the old fault grounds2' as well as two no-fault provisions: one
allowing a divorce to be granted where both spouses agree that the
marriage is irretrievably broken" and the other authorizing a divorce
to be granted on the petition of one of the spouses where the parties
have lived separate and apart for three years or more and the court
finds the marriage to be irretrievably broken.' Additionally, the com-
ment will explore those provisions which, for the first time in this com-
monwealth," authorize alimony awards, and which provide for an
equitable distribution of marital property."
II. GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE PRIOR TO THE NEW DIVORCE CODE
Fault grounds have been the cornerstone of this commonwealth's
divorce laws from the outset. The first divorce law enacted in Penn-
sylvania provided for absolute divorce on the grounds of impotency,
bigamy, adultery, desertion or marriage on false rumor of death." Also
included within this initial statute were the grounds of abandonment,
cruel and barbarous treatment and indignities to the person, all of
which were available only to a wife when suing her husband for a
18. Pa. S.B. 342, 161st Sess. (1977); Pa. S.B. 404, 161st Sess. (1977); Pa. S.B. 1452,
160th Sess. (1976); Pa. H.B. 2376, 160th Sess. (1976); Pa. H.B. 1657, 159th Sess. (1975).
19. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 56. See notes 25-28 and accom-
panying text infra.
20. See text acompanying note.10 supra. Note however that the grounds of impotency,
fraud, marriage within prohibited degrees of consanguinity and affinity, and false rumor
of death have been deleted as grounds for divorce in the new Code. While the first three
are now grounds for annulment, Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, §§ 204(a)(2), (4), (5), 1980 Pa.
Legis. Serv. 52-53, the false rumor ground has been deleted from the Divorce Code. The
only other change in the new legislation concerning fault grounds is that the period of
desertion has been reduced from two years to one year. Id. § 201(a)(1), 1980 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 51.
21. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 201(c), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51.
22. Id. § 201(d).
23. Id. §§ 501-507, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 58-60.
24. Id. §§ 401-404, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 55-58.
25. Divorce and Alimony Act of 1785, c. 1176, 1781-1790 Pa. Laws 343.
1980
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divorce from bed and board (legal separation). In 1815 the divorce law
was recodified. The only change was that the period of desertion was
reduced and cruelty and indignities were added as grounds for an ab-
solute divorce." The present divorce law was enacted in 1929, making
only insignificant changes to the 1815 version,27 and has remained
substantially unchanged since that time.28
That Pennsylvania has retained its fault system substantially intact
for almost two hundred years does not necessarily mean that all the
grounds have been equally utilized. The ground of indignities has been
by far the most common basis for a divorce in this commonwealth.'
Since most of the fault grounds have been retained under the new
Divorce Code' there is no reason to believe that indignities will not
26. Act of March 13, 1815, c. 109, 1815 Pa. Laws 150.
27. The remaining grounds of fraud and conviction of certain crimes were added in
1854. Act of May 8, 1854, No. 629, 1854 Pa. Laws 644. Marriage within the prohibited
degrees of consanguinity or affinity was added as a ground for divorce with the enact-
ment of the 1929 Divorce Law.
28. Since its enactment, the only change in the present divorce law has been an
amendment which allows a divorce to be granted where the defendant spouse has been
confined to a mental institution for three years prior to the filing of the complaint, and
there appears to be no reasonably foreseeable prospect of the defendant being released
from inpatient care within three years from the date of the filing. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit.
23, § 10(4) (Purdon Supp. 1979). Prior to the enactment of this amendment in 1972, insanity of
a spouse was not an independent ground for divorce. Even though the 1972 amendment
changed that concept, only one case has been reported under this section as of this
writing. Rome v. Rome, 35 Beaver Co. L.J. 1 (1975) (divorce granted). This is probably
because of the strict requirements of the section and the fact that few physicians are will-
ing to predict that there is no reasonably foreseeable prospect of being discharged within
the next three years. Raphael, Divorce in America: The Erosion of Fault, 81 DICK L. REV.
719, 723 n.18 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Raphael].
29. In 1978, the distribution by grounds for divorces and annulments in Pennsylvania
was as follows:
Legal Grounds for Decree Total Divorces Annulments
TOTAL 38,261 38,165 96
Indignities 34,584 34,578 6
Desertion 2,517 2,517 -
Cruelty 352 352 -
Conviction of Crime 54 54 -
Bigamy 32 12 20
Adultery 37 37 -
Fraud 9 8 1
Impotency 4 3 1
Coercion or Incestuous Marriage 1 1 -
Miscellaneous 78 17 61
Not Stated 593 586 7
PA. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE STATISTICS, supra note 4, at 29 (Table 22).
30. See note 20 and accompanying text supra.
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continue to be the most widely utilized fault ground. Thus, because
the indignities ground should continue to be an integral part of the
divorce law under the new Divorce Code, an examination of some of
the legal issues that have arisen in connection with the indignities
ground should be relevant to future divorce actions.
Nearly all of the divorce actions filed in Pennsylvania prior to the
new Divorce Code were based upon the ground of indignities. 1 Both
the old statute and the new Code state simply that an action can be
maintained by the injured and innocent spouse where he has suffered
such indignities as to make his condition intolerable and life burden-
some. However, no definition of indignities is expounded in the statute,
and just what constitutes an indignity has been left to judicial deter-
mination based upon the particular facts of each case. Nevertheless, it
has been stated that indignities can consist of vulgarity, unmerited
reproach, habitual humiliating treatment, studied neglect, intentional
uncivility, manifest disdain, abusive language, malignant ridicule, and
every other manifestation of settled hate and estrangement; but slight
or irregular acts of misconduct are insufficient.2 Consequently, it has
been held that incompatability, nagging," bad temperment, domestic
insufficiency and refusal of sexual intercourse' do not establish
grounds for divorce.
31. Raphael, supra note 28, at 724.
32. Mintz v. Mintz, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 392 A.2d 747 (1978) (divorce granted
where wife constantly berated husband, told others husband was sinful, insisted that he
follow her rules around the house, would not socialize with husband's family or friends,
and denied husband sexual relations). See Melli v. Melli, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 384 A.2d
1347 (1978).
33. Compare Edstrand v. Edstrand, 206 Pa. Super. Ct. 413, 212 A.2d 921 (1965)
(divorce denied where complaint alleged petty quarrels and nagging as grounds) with
Mintz v. Mintz, 258 Pa. Super. Ct. 187, 392 A.2d 747 (1978) (nagging, while not itself a
ground for divorce, can be taken into consideration since it evidences settled hate and
estrangement).
34. Simons v. Simons, 196 Pa. Super. Ct. 650, 176 A.2d 105 (1962). But see FREEDMAN
& FREEDMAN, LAW OF MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE IN PENNSYLVANIA § 319 (2nd ed. 1957)
[hereinafter cited as MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE] where the authors state that adherence to
such a rule is incongruous since state policy encourages procreation pursuant to marriage,
and impotency is a ground for divorce, although refusal of sex, which is fundamentally the
same situation, is not. Additionally, such conduct fulfills all the requirements of indignities.
It is intentional, continuous, directed toward the innocent party and shows settled hate
and estrangement.
At least one court has rejected the traditional principle and permitted a divorce where
sexual relations were refused:
We cannot help but believe that the refusal of sexual intercourse by a wife to
the average sensitive husband for a period of nine years while he furnished her
with a home and paid all her bills is more of an indignity to him than calling him an
unkind name which we have so freely accepted as an indignity.
Shaffer v. Shaffer, 30 Somerset 219, 225 (1975).
1980
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The libellant in an action based on indignities must establish a con-
tinuity of ill conduct by the respondent and can never be granted a
divorce based simply on one incident. No length of time has been
established within which this conduct must continue, for the test
centers upon the continuity and severity of the indignity and not the
period of conduct. A divorce can be granted for indignities based upon
mental violence, and indignities may be also committed by negative
conduct, such as isolating the innocent party so as to render his condi-
tion intolerable and life burdensome."8 False accusation of adultery or
other humiliating charges may, if continually made so as to establish a
course of conduct, constitute indignities. However, for the divorce to
be granted, the charge must be false and may not be a good faith ac-
cusation based upon a reasonable suspicion." It should be noted that
while certain accusations made between the spouses privately may not
be sufficient to make the innocent spouse's condition intolerable and
life burdensome, those same statements if made in public may be suffi-
cient to support a divorce.
Provocation and retaliation are applicable to indignities, as they are
to the other fault grounds of divorce. Therefore, if the libellant provoked
the indignities from the respondent a decree will not be granted,37 pro-
vided that the retaliatory indignities were not unreasonable. Addi-
tionally, where provocation is asserted, the respondent has the burden
to show that the retaliation was not excessive. The courts in this situa-
tion, as in deciding whether the facts are severe enough to render a
condition intolerable and life burdensome, are not constrained by strict
legal principles applicable to courts of law, and can, therefore, take in-
to account the sensitivities of the particular parties. 38
Mere continuance of cohabitation of sexual intercourse during the
time of the alleged wrongful conduct is not a bar to a divorce based
upon indignities. 9 This is so because the statute requires that a course
35. Clements v. Clements, 21 Pa. D. & C. 661 (Phila. 1934) (husband's refusal to sleep,
eat, talk with his wife or go out with her socially constituted an indignity by husband
which negated the wilful and malicious aspect of wife's desertion).
36. Riley v. Riley, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 265, 369 A.2d 1314 (1976), allocatur denied
(1977).
37. Melli v. Melli, 253 Pa. Super. Ct. 286, 384 A.2d 1347 (1978) (divorce denied where
respondent wife was alleged to have thrown a drink at her husband, slapped him, used
vulgar language and embarrassed him and refused to perform household duties, since hus-
band's conduct could constitute indignities on his part). See also Sieno v. Sieno, 163 Pa.
Super. Ct. 479, 61 A.2d 778 (1948).
38. Albrecht v. Albrecht, 176 Pa. Super. Ct. 626, 109 A.2d 209 (1954).
39. Prior to 1923, the law required that for a wife to maintain an action for divorce
based on indignities, she must have been forced to withdraw from her husband's house
due to his conduct. Act of March 13, 1815, c. 109, 1815 Pa. Laws 150. This requirement
was abolished in 1923. Act of June 28, 1923, No. 340, 1923 Pa. Laws 886.
Vol. 18:877
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of conduct be established, and if the individual actions of the respond-
ent were examined separately, they might not be sufficient to support
a decree. Even if the ill treatment ceases completely, the suit is not
barred, but a lengthy cohabitation would be considered when determin-
ing if the respondent's action really made life burdensome.
Indignities was utilized most often in divorce proceedings because it
was the easiest of the grounds under which to obtain a divorce.
Moreover, if an additional ground is pleaded and fails, very often the
evidence used to support that ground could be considered as con-
tributory to the ill conduct required under indignities. Finally, in-
dignities was utilized most frequently and will continue to be the fault
ground pleaded most often, because it appears that under this ground,
the judges have the most leeway to shape the result which they feel is
necessary.
The elements necessary to obtain a divorce under the indignities
ground are representative of the other fault grounds upon which a
divorce may be predicated. As is discussed below, the adversarial
nature of divorce proceedings based upon these fault grounds not only
breeds contempt and ill feeling between the involved spouses, but also
places a strain upon the judicial system, and upon the judge called on
to decide the appropriateness of a divorce decree.
III. FAULTS OF THE FAULT SYSTEM
Pennsylvania has essentially maintained the same grounds for
divorce since the original divorce law was enacted in 1785. In so doing,
this commonwealth has perpetuated the social policy reasons which
formed the basis of that first divorce law. The criticism most often
leveled against the fault system of divorce is that such a system has
been unable to free itself from these ancient policies and adjust to the
changing attitudes and ideals of modern society."0
The most salient of all of the policy reasons underlying the fault
system is that its justification rests upon an assumption that dif-
ficulties within the marriage relationship can be assigned to the faults
of one of the parties. This justification ignores the realities associated
with a marital relationship in modern society. The breakdown of a mar-
riage results from the complex interactions of two or more per-
sonalities, and not from the actions of only one party.' Moreover, it is
difficult to know what conduct, perhaps subtle and unintentional, of
40. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 79; Raphael, supra note 28, at 728. See
also Note, The No-Fault ConcepL. Is This the Final State in the Evolution of Divorce?, 47
NOTRE DAME LAW. 959, 965 (1972) [hereinafter cited as No-Fault Concept].
41. Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 79.
1980
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the "innocent" party may have provoked the allegedly "guilty" party
to act.
Coupled with the misconception that marital discord is due to the
fault of only one of the parties is the presumption that if no fault can
be demonstrated, a happy and viable marriage exists. 2 Marriages,
however, break down due to psychological pressures and anxiety
created by both .parties, and the faults alleged are usually only the
manifestations of-a dead marriage rather than the cause of the marital
breakdown."
A third defense of the fault system of divorce has been the idea that
the state has an overriding interest in promoting the public welfare by
encouraging family stability. Under this rationale, the state is an "un-
named third party"" to every divorce action in this commonwealth. Only
where compelling reasons are shown by clear and convincing evidence
will a decree issue. The courts are quite strict in assuring that a
divorce is granted only on the statutory grounds and only to an "inno-
cent and injured" party.'5
Based on these policies, Pennsylvania has recognized several
defenses to a divorce action that will prohibit a decree from issuing
even though the moving party has shown the fault of his or her
spouse. The defenses of connivance, condonation and recrimination are
the statutory defenses, which apply only to the ground of adultery.46
Connivance is the corrupt assent of one party to the commission of the
adulterous acts of the other. Condonation is the eradication of the of-
fense by resumption of the marital status after the injured spouse has
learned of the adultery. Of these two defenses, connivance would seem
to be more justifiable, since it is unfair to permit a spouse to terminate
a marriage because of a situation to which he or she agreed. Condona-
tion, on the other hand, would appear to contravene the com-
monwealth's policy of promoting family stability, since it stands in the
way of any attempted reconciliation between the parties. No true at-
tempt at reconciliation could exist without a full resumption of marital
42. No-Fault Concept, supra note 40, at 965.
43. See Note, Does No-Fault Divorce Portend No-Fault Alimony?, 34 U. PITT. L.
REv. 486, 494 (1973) [hereinafter cited as No-Fault Alimony].
44. Mirarchi v. Mirarchi, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 53, 311 A.2d 698 (1973); Deussing v.
Deussing, 224 Pa. Super. Ct. 525, 307 A.2d 382 (1973). See also No-Fault Concept. supra
note 40, at 966 (suggests that since women have become able to function separately and in-
dependently, the state's interest in protecting the marital relationship is deemed to be
small). Accord, Volid v. Volid, 6 Ill. App. 3d 386, 286 N.E.2d 42 (1972).
45. Rensch v. Rensch, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 381 A.2d 925 (1977); Ryave v. Ryave,
249 Pa. Super. Ct. 78, 375 A.2d 766 (1977); Mirarchi v. Mirarchi, 226 Pa. Super. Ct. 53, 311
A.2d 698 (1973). See also notes 61-62 and accompanying text infra.
46. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 52 (Purdon 1955).
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relations; yet, if the innocent spouse attempts to forgive but soon finds
this impossible, that spouse is not entitled to a divorce based upon
adultery. 7 Under this condition, spouses may actually have bypassed
reconciliation so as not to lose their right to divorce. Therefore, the
defense appears to thwart rather than to support the idea of family
stability.
Of the three statutory defenses to a divorce action based on
adultery, that of recrimination is the most reprehensible. Under this
defense, a spouse who is guilty of adultery is precluded from raising
the other spouse's adultery as a ground for divorce. Thus, the com-
monwealth forces two people, who have plainly shown that their mar-
riage means nothing to them, to remain man and wife. The underlying
rationale for this defense is that the parties are "suitable and proper
companions" for each other.'8 None of the views put forward in support
of recrimination justify the continued viability of this defense in Penn-
sylvania. One view is that the courts will not declare a divorce in favor
of a party who has unclean hands.'9 If this were the policy followed in
this commonwealth, then the defense of recrimination would be ap-
plicable to all grounds of divorce. At present, it is applicable only
where adultery is alleged.5" Another view is that divorce is not to be
encouraged, and that it is for the public good to keep marriages
together. Under this argument, however, divorce is seen as a reward
for the innocent and a punishment for the guilty,' a result which is in
fact contrary to the policy of the public good, since it requires contin-
uance of a marriage that has been doubly broken. Under Pennsylvania
law, therefore, judges are required to cover their eyes and to maintain
the misconceptions that since the marriage exists de jure, it is
operative de facto. Finally, it has been said that the existence of the
recrimination defense deters immorality, because the threat of not be-
47. Commonwealth v. Sanders, 187 Pa. Super. Ct. 494, 144 A.2d 749 (1958) (divorce
denied where it appeared from the evidence that two months prior to the commencement
of the divorce action the libellant husband had spent several weekends with his
adulterous wife).
48. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 34, at § 347.
49. Id. See also Moore, A Critique of the Recrimination Doctrine, 68 DICK. L. REV.
157, 162 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Moore], where the author states that if the "clean
hands" doctrine is to be used in divorce proceedings then it should be employed, as in
other situations, only where it would not produce an unwise or unjust result.
50. See Berezin v. Berezin, 186 Pa. Super. Ct. 340, 142 A.2d 741 (1958) (recrimination
held not applicable where divorce based on desertion); Shoemaker v. Shoemaker, 199 Pa.
Super. Ct. 61, 184 A.2d 282, allocatur denied (1962) (recrimination held not applicable
where divorce based on indignities); Murphy v. Murphy, 204 Pa. Super. Ct. 576, 205 A.2d
647 (1964) (recrimination is not a defense where ground alleged for divorce is conviction of
a crime). See also note 46 supra.
51. See No-Fault Concep4 supra note 40, at 963.
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ing able to obtain a divorce renders a party less likely to commit
adultery.52 This would appear to be of little deterrence, for the
adulteror does his deed with the expectation that the other spouse will
not learn of his action and merely accepts the possibility that he may
get caught. Additionally, recrimination may actually promote immoral-
ity. If the court denies a divorce to two people who are unwilling or
unable to live together, it is foolish to think that their emotional and
physical needs will die along with their marriage,53 and the result will
be that they will satisfy their needs outside the marital relationship.
In addition to the express statutory defenses available in a divorce
action based on adultery, the courts in Pennsylvania have applied
several defenses to divorce actions generally. Of these judicial
defenses the two most important are the "injured and innocent" re-
quirement and the defense of provocation. Similar to the idea of
recrimination, the courts will deny a divorce on the grounds of in-
dignities or cruelty where both parties are so nearly at fault as to pre-
vent them from being considered injured and innocent.' Additionally,
acts of the party contesting the divorce will not be deemed sufficient
for the granting of a divorce if those acts were in response to provoca-
tion by the party seeking the divorce.55 As with the statutory defenses,
the judicial defenses tend to frustrate the underlying policy of divorce
law. If the situation has deteriorated to the point at which a divorce
action with mutual fault accusations is necessary, the commmonwealth
only aggravates the situation by requiring the two parties to continue
the marital relationship.
One possible solution to the problems associated with the applica-
tion of the judicial and statutory defenses to divorce proceedings
would be the adoption of the doctrine of comparative rectitude. Under
that doctrine, courts are required to weigh the misconduct of both par-
ties and to grant a divorce to the party least at fault, even though both
may have demonstrated grounds for divorce.56 The adoption of this
type of defense system, which would necessarily lead to the abolition
of the archaic defenses now recognized, would not only allow for flex-
ibility in an area of the law where it is much needed,57 but would also
resolve dead marriages rather than prolong them.
52. Moore, supra note 49, at 159.
53. See id. at 165.
54. See, e.g., Eifert v. Eifert, 219 Pa. Super. Ct. 373, 281 A.2d 657 (1971); Rankin v.
Rankin, 181 Pa. Super. Ct. 414, 124 A.2d 639, allocatur denied (1956).
55. Rensch v. Rensch, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 381 A.2d 925 (1977). However, a divorce
will be granted when the retaliatory action by the respondent spouse exceeds the pro-
vocation.
56. See MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, supra note 34, at § 347.
57. Note that the new Divorce Code both specifically includes fault grounds and re-
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Pennsylvania's adherence to its outdated policy rationale, coupled
with the defenses which have arisen under the fault system, has led to
some perhaps not so unexpected results. The most salient of these
results has been the substantial increase in the number of "migratory
divorces."" Under the fault system of divorce, migratory divorces are
encouraged. Without an alimony provision in Pennsylvania prior to the
new Divorce Code, one party to the marriage could obtain a divorce in
the neighboring no-fault states59 and then return to Pennsylvania, thus
avoiding any financial obligations to his spouse. This migratory divorce
scheme is detrimental to both the divorced spouse, who may be left
without adequate financial resources, and to the taxpayers of this
state, who may be forced to support the divorce spouse.
Another result which the old fault system encouraged was the crea-
tion of illicit relationships between the spouse seeking the divorce and
another partner. If one spouse was unwilling to allow the other to ob-
tain a divorce, that spouse was not likely to bring an action for a
divorce based on adultery, even if there was positive proof of the illicit
relationship. Not only was the original marriage unable to be ter-
minated, but the possibility existed that an illegitimate family might
ultimately be established."0 Neither result furthered Pennsylvania's
policy of preserving the family unit.
Judges in Pennsylvania have not been totally unresponsive to the
need for change in the divorce law. Perhaps in response to continuing
pressure from various groups and to combat the results of the fault
system, the courts began to liberally interpret the existing law. The
most significant steps in this area were the relaxation of the require-
ment that a divorce be granted only to an "innocent and injured
spouse." While the courts have long recognized that this does not re-
quire the moving party to be totally free from fault," the level of fault
which this party can possess has been steadily increasing."
tains the prior defenses. This seems all the more reason why comparative rectitude
should be implemented as soon as possible.
58. Migratory divorce is the common name given to those divorces which a spouse
obtains in another state after meeting that state's residency requirements.
59. Ohio requires only a six-month residency, see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.03
(Page 1980), and New Jersey mandates a one-year residency requirement before the
divorce action is commenced, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-10 (West Supp. 1979). The use
of migratory divorce is widespread, since Pennsylvania's two largest cities are relatively
close to these borders. Spouses seeking divorces set up residence in these sister states
and still maintain their jobs within Pennsylvania with relative ease.
60. See No-Fault concept, supra note 40, at 965 (citing NEW JERSEY FINAL REPORT OF
DIVORCE LAW STUDY COMMISSION 7-10 (1970)).
61. Rensch v. Rensch, 252 Pa. Super. Ct. 294, 381 A.2d 925 (1977); Bonawitz v.
Bonawitz, 246 Pa. Super. Ct. 257, 265, 369 A.2d 1310, 1313 (1976); Gray v. Gray, 220 Pa.
Super. Ct. 143, 147, 286 A.2d 684, 687 (1971).
62. See O'Leary v. O'Leary, 399 A.2d 765 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1979) (husband found to be
1980
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It appears that the courts will attempt to grant a divorce whenever
the situation truly requires that result, and when that result can be
achieved without totally contravening the language of the statute. 3
Under the old divorce law, "just" results were often achieved through
a liberal interpretation of the statutory language. Unfortunately, that
language was not susceptible to liberal application in all situations. In
those cases in which judges perceived the statute as a barrier to the
achievement of a just result, the statute was outwardly criticized."
These criticisms exemplify many of the problems associated with the
fault system, and demonstrate that even a liberal interpretation of the
statutory provisions may not totally solve the problems.
Paramount among those problems is the encouragement of perjury.
In the absence of the necessary statutory grounds, the parties often
negotiate for a favorable settlement and then allow the divorce to pro-
ceed uncontested. Since one party is not there to contest, this actually
gives the moving spouse the freedom to "create" grounds for divorce. 5
Most lawyers and judges who deal with these proceedings are aware
of this shortcoming," yet continue to administer the system. Not only
are these officers of the court perceived as parties to the deceit, but
injured and innocent spouse even though he admitted to his wife that he had sexual rela-
tions with other women during their marriage, and he had accompanied a friend's wife
and children to Florida for a weekend during the marriage).
63. See Steinke v. Steinke, 238 Pa. Super. Ct. 74, 357 A.2d 674 (1975). There, a wife
sought a divorce on the grounds of indignities due to her husband's attempt to have a sex
change operation. He appeared in public many times dressed in women's attire and
started to adopt a feminine appearance due to hormones he was taking. The lower court
denied a divorce because it reasoned that the husband's conduct was the result of mental
illness, was unintentional and lacked the spirit of hate and estrangement necessary for in-
dignities. The superior court reversed, holding that the husband's conduct was not the
result of mental disorder, but rather was the "indulgence of a private fantasy," and
granted the divorce. Id. at 82, 357 A.2d at 678.
64. Gray v. Gray, 220 Pa. Super. Ct. 143, 147 n.4, 286 A.2d 684, 686 n.4 (1971) ("This
case illustrates the difficulty under which our legal system labors due to the refusal of
the Pennsylvania legislature to reform our domestic relations law .... A divorce statute
which allowed for divorce without the assignment of fault is the logical solution and we
hope the legislature is not tardy in considering such a measure."); Kern v. Kern, 33
Lehigh L.J. 486, 487 (1970) ("Admittedly, this court has liberally construed the archaic and
unrealistic divorce laws in Pennsylvania in order to do practical justice in the time in
which we live. Decrees in divorce have been granted in uncontested cases where in-
dignities under existing law have been weak indeed.").
65. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 80. This is done even though the petition
must aver that, in fact, the divorce is not collusive between the two spouses. It should be
noted, however, that collusion is often difficult to prove unless one of the spouses himself
alleges it.
66. See Note, Florida's No-Fault Divorce: Is It Really No-Fault?, 4 FLA. ST. U.L.
REv. 504, 507 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Florida's No-Fault].
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nothing has been done to alleviate this problem, which can only foster
disrespect for the entire divorce proceeding.
A system based on fault also tends to eliminate any chance the par-
ties might have at a reconciliation. Once the complaint is filed, and the
parties start pointing an accusatory finger at each other, the real
reasons for the breakdown of the marriage are only aggravated. The
parties are drawn further and further apart and little time is devoted
toward reconciliation."1 Furthermore, the hatred and bitterness which
the fault system creates often prevents amicable relations between the
parties after the divorce. 8 Such relations are vitally important and
must be established, especially if children are involved. Otherwise, the
loyalties of the children become weapons for each parent to use
against the other. A system which produces such adverse reactions
contravenes the commonwealth's policy of protecting the family unit.
The third problem with the fault system of divorce is that by utiliz-
ing that system the spouses are obligated to expose, not only to their
lawyers, but perhaps in open court, the intimacies of the marital rela-
tionship. It has been posited that such exposure is irrelevant to any
state interest. 9 Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has found an
invasion of marital privacy to be repulsive to traditional notions and
values of marital life."0 Chances that only a limited exposure may be
made are slim, since the master, appointed by the court, is under a duty
to require the presentation of all relevant testimony so that a divorce
may not be obtained by imposition. Even if the invasion of privacy
could be seen as justifiable under the fault system, it has been ques-
tioned whether the courts have the resources or expertise necessary
to make an accurate finding of fault.7
Furthermore, at least one commentator has posited that the effects
created by a divorce system based on fault are discriminatory as to the
poor. 2 With the emergence of migratory divorces," spouses who have
67. The new Divorce Code attempts to alleviate this problem not only by instituting
no-fault grounds but by additionally requiring a ninety-day cooling off period between the
filing of the complaint and the commencement of proceedings. During this period, profes-
sional counseling can be authorized if one spouse so requests. See notes 118-128 and ac-
companying text infra.
68. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 81.
69. Id. at 82.
70. Griswold v. Conneticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). Even though Griswold involved
unauthorized state invasion, and a party seeking a divorce could be seen to have authorized
an exposure of marital privacy, under the present system this authorization could be
viewed as compelled, since this is the only way to escape a dead marriage.
71. Hill & Stogel, Family Law, 1976 ANN. SURVEY AM. L. 359, 363 [hereinafter cited
as Hill & Stoegell. See also Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 77-80.
72. See Florida's No-Fault. supra note 66, at 507.
73. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
1980 889
890 Duquesne Law Review Vol. 18:877
the money to establish residence in a sister state can obtain a divorce
under that state's no-fault statute. The poor, who cannot afford this
luxury, are left either to cope with the fault system or to resort to the
"poor man's divorce" of desertion." Additionally, the fault system
tends to make divorce more expensive than the no-fault systems, with
a possible discriminatory effect on the low income families."5
Finally, the inadequacy of the fault system has caused many compe-
tent lawyers to refrain from the practice of family law. Understand-
ably, a system which is marred by hypocrisy and perjury is appealing
to very few. Morover, the family lawyer is called upon to be a combina-
tion of social psychologist, marriage counselor and tax specialist. With
the need for such expertise, it is unfortunate that many lawyers are
abandoning the practice of family law."6 By abolishing the fault system
altogether, not only will dignity be restored to family law, but more at-
torneys will be willing to handle divorce matters. More time could be
spent on an attempt at counseling and conciliation in an unemotional
and impartial atmosphere, rather than in searching for evidence of
fault, or in attempting to place blame on one or the other party. The
emphasis will turn from the question of "can I get a divorce" to
"should I get a divorce," which should have been the focus from the
very beginning.
In short, Pennsylvania's fault system of divorce presented a
multitude of problems and did not effectuate the policies upon which
it was based. These problems associated with the fault system of
divorce were not unique to Pennsylvania, and have been succinctly
summarized as follows:
Perhaps in no other area has the discrepancy between law in dogmatic
theory and law in action, evading dogma by fiction and subterfuge,
become so marked as in divorce law. The withered dogma that divorce
can be granted only for marital fault, variously and eccentrically defined
from state to state, is rendered still more irrational by the widespread
rule that recrimination is an absolute defense. The result has been
triumph, not for dogma, but for hypocrisy. Rules insensitive to reality
have been cynically circumvented by litigants and attorneys, with the
tacit sanction of the courts."
The solutions to the problems inherent in Pennsylvania's fault system
are not simple. Their formulation involves the careful weighing of
various social, political, ethical and moral interests which the divorce
74. See Florida's No-Faul t supra note 66, at 507.
75. Id. at 507 n.31.
76. Cannell, supra note 1, at 100-02.
77. Traynor, Law and Social Change in a Democratic Society, 1956 U. ILL. L.F. 230,
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system can affect. The Pennsylvania legislature, however, has recently
taken a long overdue step toward the reformation of this common-
wealth's divorce law by adopting a new Divorce Code.
IV. THE NEW PENNSYLVANIA DIVORCE CODE: A PARTIAL SOLUTION
On July 1, 1980, a new Divorce Code became effective in Penn-
sylvania."8 The provisions of the new Divorce Code radically change the
entire area of family law in this commonwealth. No only are provisions
for alimony and counseling included in the new legislation, but two
new grounds for divorce are added, as well as a section completely
revising the method of property distribution.
In setting forth the grounds for divorce, the Pennsylvania
legislature has unfortunately not completely resolved the inadequacies
of past divorce laws. Although a divorce will now be granted when the
marriage is irretrievably broken,"9 or when the parties have lived
separate and apart for three years,' the grounds for divorce based
upon the assessment of "fault" were also preserved." It is difficult to
understand why the legislature retained the fault grounds, since none
of the policy objectives set forth in the Code8" are advanced by the in-
78. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50.
79. Id. § 201(c).
80. Id. at § 201(d). See note 104 infra.
81. Id. §§ 201(a), (b). See note 20 supra.
82. Section 102, which sets forth the legislative findings and intent, provides as
follows:
(a) The family is the basic unit in society and the protection and preservation of the
family is of paramount public concern. Therefore, it is hereby declared to be the
policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to:
(1) Make the law for legal dissolution of marriage effective for dealing with
the realities of matrimonial experience.
(2) Encourage and effect reconciliation and settlement of differences between
spouses, especially where children are involved.
(3) Give primary consideration to the welfare of the family rather than the
vindication of private rights or the punishment of matrimonial wrongs.
(4) Mitigate the harm to the spouses and their children caused by the legal
dissolution of the marriage.
(5) Seek causes rather than symptoms of family disintegration and cooperate
with and utilize the resources available to deal with family problems.
(6) Effectuate economic justice between parties who are divorced or
separated and grant or withhold alimony according to the actual need and abil-
ity to pay of the parties and insure a fair and just determination and settlement
of their property rights.
(b) The objectives set forth in subsection (a) shall be considered in construing provi-
sions of this act and shall be regarded as expressing the legislative intent.
Id. § 102.
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clusion of those grounds. In fact, these objectives were the basis of
criticism leveled against the fault system. Additionally, by retaining
the fault grounds in the new Code, Pennsylvania has also retained all
the problems that had become inherent to that system.83
One reason that may have convinced the legislature to retain the
fault provisions in the new statute was a desire to avoid turning Penn-
sylvania into a divorce-encouraging state. Also, it is possible that the
legislators did not want a spouse who committed atrocious marital
conduct to escape the marriage unscathed. However, the most likely
reason that the fault provisions were included is the existence of
strong ties between the legislators and organized religious groups in
Pennsylvania, who believe that divorce itself is basically wrong." It
may have been politically safe to approve a bill that in some cases
would still punish a guilty spouse. In any event, the retention of the
fault grounds, coupled with other factors which will be discussed later
in this comment,85 may in effect necessitate a consideration of marital
fault in every contested divorce action commenced under the new
Code.
A. The New Grounds
1. "Irretrievably Broken" Marriage
Section 201(c) of the Divorce Code mandates that a divorce shall be
granted where the marriage is found to be irretrievably broken. Two
conditions must be met before a divorce can be granted under this sec-
tion. First, ninety days must have elapsed between the filing of the
complaint and the granting of the decree; and additionally, each spouse
must sign an affidavit consenting to the divorce." By adding this sec-
83. See notes 40-77 and accompanying text supra.
84. As is pointed out in one recent study:
[Tihere is a precarious balance between metropolitan representatives and those
from rural or small town areas and the accompanying phenomenon that "liberal"
urban representatives abandon progressive attitudes once a cardinal, archbishop,
rabbi or other church leader takes a strong stand. When the legislative issue is
ERA, planned parenthood or abortion, or a substantial revision of divorce law, we
see backsliding by the liberals or progressives from normal political philosophy.
Freed & Foster, Divorce in the Fifty States: An Overview as of 1978, 13 FAM. L.Q. 105,
106 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Freed & Foster].
85. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text infra.
86. Section 201(c) states:
It shall be lawful for the court to grant a divorce where a complaint has been filed
alleging that the marriage is irretrievably broken and 90 days ,have elapsed from
the date of filing of the complaint and an affidavit has been filed by each of the par-
ties evidencing that each of the parties consents to the divorce.
Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 201(c), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51.
Vol. 18:877
1980 Divorce Reform
tion, Pennsylvania joins the majority of the states that have im-
plemented no-fault divorce provisions.87 The use of the "irretrievably
broken" standard has been so widely accepted that attacks on this pro-
vision are unlikely to be sustained." Not only did this provision meet
little opposition when the bill was being considered in the Penn-
sylvania legislature, but the staunchest opponent to the new Code, the
Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, gave it conditional approval.
The question which arises in connection with the "irretrievably
broken" standard is whether divorces will be granted merely upon the
request of the consenting spouses. Section 201(c) allows for no deter-
mination of "irretrievably broken" to be made by a court, thus with-
drawing any substantive objective values from the phrase. The result
apparently is that divorces will be granted upon request after a ninety-
day waiting period, so long as both parties have signed an affidavit at-
testing to the fact that there is no chance of reconciliation. The effect
of such a procedure is yet to be seen, but if the suitability of the
spouses for one another and their state of mind toward the marriage is
to be controlling under the "irretreivably broken" standard, evaluation
by objective criteria would seem to be impossible. 1 It has been stated
87. In 1970, California became the first state to adopt a no-fault divorce provision.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4506 (West 1970). Illinois and South Dakota remain the only two states
that do not have some sort of no-fault provisions. See FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 401-453 (Ref.
file 1980).
88. See Comment, Abolition of Guilt in Marriage Dissolution: Wisconsin's Adoption
of No-Fault Divorce, 61 MARQ. L. REV. 672, 681-82 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Abolition of
Guilt], where the author points out that no-fault statutes have survived attacks based on:
impairment of contractual rights, due process violations because of indefiniteness and
vagueness, deprivation of vested rights, and impairing the discretion of the court because
all the factors of the breakdown are not brought out.
89. Pennsylvania Catholic Conference, Upholding Marriage and Family Life:
Testimony On Senate Bill 450 and House Bill 640, at 21 (presented to Senate and House
Judiciary Committees, April 25, 1979) ("Further, we can tolerate-though not enthusi-
astically-a new ground which eliminates adversary proceedings in cases where both par-
ties and the court agree that reconcilation is impossible, provided that such new ground is
accompanied by an effective counseling provision") [hereinafter cited as Catholic Con-
ference Testimony].
90. An argument can be made that regardless of a lack of language in section 201(c)
dealing with a judicial finding of "irretrievably broken," a judicial finding should be made.
Since the preservation of the family is of paramount public concern, see note 82 supra, it
would appear that the legislators did not intend for a divorce to be granted on merely
trivial grounds. Additionally, if neither of the parties request counseling within the
ninety-day period provided in section 202(b), time alone will be the sole deterrent to
divorces based on frivolous grounds. Finally, since the court is required in some cases
under section 201(d) to determine whether there is an irretrievably broken marriage, it
seems illogical to conclude that they cannot make a similar determination where both par-
ties consent.
91. Abolition of Guilt, supra note 88, at 680.
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that the simplest proof of marital breakdown is that both spouses at-
test to the fact that realistically it is no longer possible for them to
live as husband and wife.92 Even in those states where the determina-
tion of whether a marriage is irretrievably broken is left to the judge,
the court procedure itself tends to be little more than a formality. 9
Since the two consenting spouses could always fabricate incidents just
as they would have under the fault grounds, the only way irretrievable
breakdown will not be found by the court to exist is if the parties'
story is "tentative or incredible."94 Consequently, it is of little
significance exactly how a determination is made that the marriage is
terminated under this section for, since both spouses are consenting,
the result will be the same.
What is of significance concerning section 201(c) is its improvement
of the fault system. As expected, the irretrievable breakdown criteria
does lessen the feeling of animosity between the parties." Additionally,
under this section there is a greater possibility that the marriage is ac-
tually "dead." Under the fault system, if the grounds were met a
divorce was granted regardless of the possibility of reconciliation. The
no-fault ground, on the other hand, allows the parties to examine this
marriage over a period of time in an unemotionally charged at-
mosphere to determine if, in fact, their marriage cannot be salvaged."
However, the "irretrievably broken" standard is not a cure-all for all
bitterness associated with the termination of marriage. It has been
found that while the bickering associated with the divorce proceeding
itself has subsided, the antagonism has now shifted to the areas of
custody and support.97
So, while section 201(c) may at first glance appear to be a radical
departure from the old divorce law, in actuality it is not so different.
While parties no longer are required to satisfy a certain fault ground
to obtain a divorce, the collusion which existed under the fault system
is merely legitimized" by section 201(c) to the benefit of all involved.
92. Adams v. Adams, 238 Ga. 326, 232 S.E.2d 919 (1977).
93. In Nebraska, where there is a judicial determination of irretrievable breakdown
even where both parties consent to the divorce, the average length of such a judicial hear-
ing is sixteen minutes. Frank, Berman & Mazur-Hart, No-Fault Divorce and the Divorce
Rate: The Nebraska Experience-An Interrupted Time Series Analysis and Commen-
tary, 58 NEB. L. REv. 1, 55 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Nebraska Experience].
94. Id. at 62-63.
95. Id. at 49.
96. Id. at 54-55.
97. Id. at 51.
98. See In re Marriage of Collins, 200 N.W.2d 886, 890 (Iowa 1972), where the
Supreme Court of Iowa viewed the parties' collusive attempt to terminate the marriage
as strong evidence of the marriage breakdown.
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2. Three Year Separation-Unilateral Provision
Section 201(d) of the new Code was by far the most controversial
provision, and was opposed most vehemently by the Pennsylvania
Catholic Conference. The main thrust of the Catholic Conference's
argument was that a unilateral provision would not only negate the
permanence of marriage and actually promote divorce by desertion,99
but that it would also allow an innocent spouse who opposes the
divorce to have his or her marriage terminated without an opportunity
to assert a defense to such action. 00 Proponents of a separation period
argue that not only will it deter migratory divorces, but also that it is
consistent with the commonwealth's policy of dealing with the realities
of the matrimonial relationships, and that in reality a viable marriage
cannot exist where the parties have lived separate and apart for such
a length of time, even if one spouse insists that the marriage is not
dead. ' Section 201(d) at first glance appears to be a middle ground
between these two opposing views, but in actuality will prove to be a
victory for those opponents of unilateral divorce.
The new Divorce Code mandates that a court shall grant a divorce
where the parties have lived separate and apart for at least three
years and the marriage is irretrievably broken."2 If both spouses agree
99. Catholic Conference Testimony, supra note 89, at 11, 14-15.
100. Id. at 22. The argument that no-fault divorce leads to an increase in divorce rates
was refuted in one recent study, in which the authors, in discussing the effect of no-fault
provisions to divorce statistics in Nebraska, concluded:
In repealing Nebraska's fault divorce laws and substituting a procedure based
on the irretrievable breakdown of the marriage, the Nebraska Unicameral made a
fundamental change in the state's official outlook towards marriage, divorce and the
family. That such a dramatic shift in philosophy produced no statistically significant
change in the state's overall divorce rate and brought about few substantial altera-
tions in the manner in which divorces are procured serves to demonstrate the in-
considerable impact that the statutory grounds of divorce have on marriage stabil-
ity. While the divorce rate has skyrocketed in recent years, this phenomenon is bet-
ter explained as the product of the same social forces that produced no fault
divorce laws than as the result of such laws. When the virtues of patience,
understanding, and sacrifice are held in higher regard than they are in today's
inward-looking society, perhaps the divorce rate will drop significantly.
The Nebraska Experience, supra note 93, at 93.
101. As stated in one study:
Granting divorce, even over objection, best serves the state's goal of maximizing
individual freedom. Denial of divorce means that both parties, though no longer a
viable marital unit, are denied the freedom to establish meaningful new as well as
residual family relationships. Granting divorce, on the other hand, frees each in-
dividual to decide to marry or not to marry, even to decide to remarry one another.
Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 86.
102. It is also important to note that while it is unclear whether or not a spouse must
abandon the marital home in order to be living separate and apart, see note 112 infra, the
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that these two criteria have been met, the court must grant the
decree. But if one spouse disagrees with either of these two criteria
then the court, after a hearing, will determine whether the three-year
period was met, ' and whether or not the marriage is irretrievably
broken.' 4 If the court determines that the marriage is not irretrievably
broken, then it will continue the matter for a period of three to six
months during which time counseling for the parties may be ordered."'
Finally, at the end of such a continuation period, if one spouse still in-
sists that the marriage is dead and the other denies it, the court again
will determine whether or not the marriage is irretrievably broken. If
the court concludes that the marriage is irretrievably broken, a
divorce will be granted; otherwise it will be denied.0 6
Supreme Court of Rhode Island has held that the fact that the parties are living in the
same house is not a controlling factor in determining if there is an "irremediable
breakdown of the marriage." Flynn v. Flynn, 388 A.2d 1170 (R.I. 1978). Therefore, if the
Pennsylvania courts interpret the separate and apart provision to be satisfied even if the
spouses remain in the same house, it would follow that they could not deny the divorce
under the irretrievably broken standard of that same provision merely because of a
failure to live in different houses.
103. Pennsylvania did not include language such as "consecutive," "without interrup-
tion," or "continuously . . . immediately prior to the commencement of the action," in
describing the three-year period. See Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 201(d), 1980 Pa. Legis.
Serv. 51. Compare this provision to VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 551(7) (19,74); VA. CODE §
20-91(9)(a) (1975); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 247.12(2) (West Supp. 1979). Such an exclusion could
have two ramifications. First, the three-year separation period need not immediately
precede the filing of the complaint. The parties can attempt a reconciliation after the
period is reached and still obtain a divorce as long as the finding of no reasonable pros-
pect of reconciliation and the separation period have a sufficient nexus. See Brittner v.
Brittner, 124 N.J. Super. Ct. 259, 306 A.2d 83 (1973). Second, it is unclear whether the
three-year separation period must be consecutive in Pennsylvania. The new Code does not
resolve whether a divorce will be granted after a four-year period in which three years
have been years of complete cessation of any and all cohabitation, but where one interven-
ing year was not. Since the year of cohabitation would show a tendency for there to be
reconciliation within the three-year period, the possibility of a plaintiffs success would
seem slight. Yet, this result is not expressly required by the statutory language. It is not
clear whether the legislators were actually intending to provide for some minimal amount
of reconciliation time which would not terminate the three-year period. See note 113 infra.
104. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 201(d)(1), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51. This is a major
change from the original bill which passed the Pennsylvania House of Representatives on
October 17, 1979. See H.B. 640, Pa. Legis., 1979 Sess. Section 201(dX1) of that bill stated
that where one of the spouses alleged that a three-year separation period had been fulfilled
and that the marriage was irretrievably broken, the court was obligated to grant the
divorce as long as the allegations of the moving spouse were corroborated by one witness
other than the parties to the divorce, and ninety days had elapsed from the date of the fil-
ing of the complaint. The court played no role in the determination of the two criteria
whatsoever. Id.
105. But see note 119 infra.
106. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 201(d)(2), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51.
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This section markedly changes the original version of the Code passed
by the Pennsylvania House of Representatives, which precluded any
court determination as to whether the marriage was irretrievably
broken where sufficient evidence demonstrated that a three-year sepa-
ration had in fact occurred." 7 Not only does this new section add even
more time to the divorce proceeding, but it practically insures that a
three-year separation period will be seldom utilized as a divorce
ground in Pennsylvania.
This conclusion is based upon the two problems which plague this
unilateral section, the most important being that the separation period
is much too long. 18 After a three-year period of separation, the parties
probably would be adjusted and committed to living apart.' 9 The emo-
tional and economic toll of waiting so long will prove to be too pro-
hibitive, and the result will be a return to the fault grounds in an at-
tempt to obtain a speedier disposition."' Such a long waiting period
will also tend to extinguish any notion of reconciliation on the part of
the spouse seeking the divorce."' Since the statute requires that the
separation be for three years with "complete cessation of any and all
cohabitation, '".2 if any serious attempt at reconciliation during this
period failed, the spouse would have to begin to calculate the period
over again."' While this burden would not preclude many from
107. See note 104 supra.
108. The Nebraska Experience, supra note 93, at 47 n.180. Of the twenty-four states
that have living separate and apart provisions, only five have three-year statutes and only
Idaho has one longer than three years-five years. The other states run from a period of
six months (Vermont, Delaware) to two years (Hawaii, Louisiana). FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
401-453 (Ref. File 1980).
109. Foster, An Honest Ground for Divorce in Pennsylvania, 34 PA. B.A.Q. 646, 650
(1963) (citing the 1963 Report of the New Jersey Supreme Court's Committee on Concilia-
tion and Reconciliation) [hereinafter cited as Honest Ground].
110. Honest Ground, supra note 109, at 648.
111. The Nebraska Experience, supra note 93, at 47 n.180.
112. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 104, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 51. While the Code
defines separate and apart as a complete cessation of cohabitation, the Code does not
define cohabitation. Whether the two parties can remain in the same house and still not
be cohabitating is not answered. New Jersey requires by statute that the spouses live in
different habitations. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2 (West Supp. 1980). Delaware statutorily
permits the spouses to reside in the same house, though in different bedrooms, and still
qualify under the separate and apart ground. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1503(7) (Supp.
1978). See also Heckman v. Heckman, 245 A.2d 550 (Del. 1968). Finally, Missouri, although
not defining separate and apart, allows a unilateral divorce to be granted where the two
parties have lived separate and apart for two years. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.320(2)(Xe) (Ver-
non Supp. 1980). This section has been judicially interpreted to allow a divorce to be
granted even if the two spouses living "separate and apart" reside in the same house. See
In re Marriage of Uhls, 549 S.W.2d 107 (Mo. App. 1977).
113. See note 103 supra. Contra, DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 13, § 1505(e) (Supp. 1978). The
Delaware statute provides:
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attempting reconciliation if the separation period were only six months, a
three-year period is much more formidable and will effectively elimi-
nate any reconciliation attempt. The second factor which insures that
section 201(d) will be seldom utilized is the possibility that after the
three-year period, the court still may not grant a divorce. If the court
is going to rule on whether the marriage is irretrievably broken even
after the three-year period has expired, why have the separation
period at all? Since the separation period would seem to be only one
element of evidence" to support the moving spouse's position, if he
has enough evidence to support his position without the intervening
three years, why not allow him to obtain the divorce quickly? Such a
procedure would eliminate the possibility that an unscrupulous spouse
could delay a final decree even after the separation period had run and
even though he does not actually have grounds to prevent the
divorce."5 Additionally, if there is going to be a contest in court for the
divorce, this defeats one of the purposes of unilateral no-fault divorce,
which is to avoid this traumatic experience. Therefore, since a spouse
would be required to wait three years for a divorce which was not
guaranteed, and then could still be subjected to the rigors of a court
battle, the fault grounds become much more desirable and the
unilateral provision loses its initial appeal.
Ideally, the commonwealth should have a unilateral no-fault provi-
sion. Living apart for a specific length of time would seem to be objec-
tive proof that the marriage has failed in the eyes of at least one
spouse, and that essentially only a facade of a marriage would remain
if the parties were forced to remain married.1 ' Pennsylvania has not
adhered to this principle and because of an unnecessarily long separa-
tion period coupled with a court determination of irretrievable break-
Bona fide efforts to achieve reconciliation prior to divorce, even those that include,
temporarily, sleeping in the same bedroom and resumption of sexual relations, shall
not interrupt any period of living separate and apart, provided that the parties
have not occupied the same bedroom, or had sexual relations with each other
within the 30 day period immediately preceding the day the Court hears the peti-
tion for divorce.
Id.
114. New Jersey has determined that where the separation period exceeds the re-
quired eighteen months, there shall exist a presumption that the spouses are without any
reasonable prospect of reconciliation. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:34-2(d) (West Supp. 1979). See
also Dunston v. Dunston, 124 N.J. Super. Ct. 214, 305 A.2d 813 (1973) (presumption which
arises after eighteen-month separation period does not create a vested right to a divorce
if subsequent conduct is violative of the wording of the statue). Wisconsin has determined
that a twelve month separation period is an irrebuttable presumption. WIs. STAT. ANN. §
247.12 (West Supp. 1979).
115. See The Nebraska Experience, supra note 93, at 76.
116. See Goldstein & Gitter, supra note 1, at 78.
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down at the conclusion of the three-year period, the section will be
used sparingly, if at all.17
B. Counseling
Perhaps no other provision of the Divorce Code demonstrates as
convincingly Pennsylvania's adherence and belief in its policy of family
preservation as that involving counseling. Section 202 provides that
when either the mutual consent no-fault ground or the fault ground of
indignities is asserted as grounds for divorce, the court shall, upon re-
quest of one of the parties, require up to three counseling sessions dur-
ing the ninety-day waiting period.1 The section also requires counsel-
ing if the unilateral provision is utilized as a ground for divorce, but
only when one spouse denies that the marriage is irretrievably broken
and the court finds that there is a reasonable prospect of reconcilia-
tion."9 Finally, the court may require counseling, without the request
of one of the spouses, where the parties have at least one child under
sixteen years of age."' Substantially similar counseling provisions in
other states have proved to be extremely beneficial. 2 ' Additionally, at
117. This conclusion may not be valid during the early period of the Code. The new
Divorce Code states that:
The provisions of this act shall apply to all cases, whether the cause for divorce or
annulment arose prior or subsequent to enactment of this act. The provisions of
this act shall not affect any suit or action pending, but the same may be proceeded
with and concluded either under the laws in existence when suit or action was in-
stituted, notwithstanding the repeal of such laws by this act, or, upon application
granted, under the provisions of this act.
Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 103, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50. The effect of this section will
be that spouses who have lived separate and apart for three years or more could get an
immediate divorce if both consented, or if one spouse objected and the court found the
marriage to be irretrievably broken. Those parties who have lived separate and apart for
less than three years would only have to wait a period of time equal to the difference be-
tween the three years and the time already spent separated, before filing a petition for
divorce.
118. Id § 202(a), (b). It appears that the counseling provision will be used infrequently
with regard to indignities, because it is not mandatory and accusations by one party
against the other will tend to widen the gap between the spouses rather than bring them
closer together.
119. Id. § 202(c). Although this section provides that counseling shall be required
where either of the parties request it, a possible argument could be made that the re-
quirement is mandatory since § 201(d)(2) states that the court "shall require counseling as
provided in section 202." Neither the section dealing with mutual consent nor the indigni-
ties section makes any reference to counseling at all. Additionally, it would seem logical
to impose such a mandatory provision since it has been more than three years of separa-
tion and the court has found there to be a prospect of reconciliation; the court never
makes such a determination with the other two grounds.
120. Id. § 201(c).
121. Maricopa County, Arizona, where a conciliation court has operated successfully
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least one commentator has stated that half of the people who file
divorce suits might insist that they want a divorce, but, in actuality,
are secretly hoping that someone will straighten out the situation
before the final decree is issued.1
2
2
Theoretically, a conciliation provision can only be viewed as advan-
tageous. In praticality, however, section 202 presents problems which
could frustrate the attainment of the desired result. Initially, if one
party requests conciliation the court must require either one, two or
three sessions within ninety days.123 However, there is no provision
which requires the other spouse to attend these sessions. It has been
recognized that where only one spouse from a weak marriage attends
counseling sessions, divorce is often the result; in contrast, joint
counseling could strengthen the marriage. 2' If the counseling sessions
are to have any potential for effecting a reconciliation, it is necessary
for both spouses to participate. Therefore, when counseling is re-
quested by one of the parties, the court should require the non-
requesting spouse to also attend, perhaps by use of its subpoena or
citation power.' 5
Compulsory conciliation may also alleviate another problem
associated with marriage counseling. Many people tend to distrust
counseling; this distrust is frequently based upon pride.' Compulsory
conciliation would not be so distasteful to a party since it is the judge,
not the litigant, who feels that the counseling is necessary.
Unfortunately, the counseling provision as presently drafted may
prove to be a method for effecting reconciliation that is not available
to the poor. The court is only required to supply the parties with a list
of qualified professionals. The parties must pay the price for counsel-
ing sessions, which do not come cheaply. Therefore, section 202 will
have little or no effect on the lower economic classes, since most
couples will be financially foreclosed from utilizing the provision. The
only way to preclude this result is to integrate the counseling services
since 1965, reported that in the thirteen-year period between 1965 and 1978, 7,486 couples
with marital difficulty were reconciled. Additionally, in that same county, during
1976-1977, forty-eight percent of all couples who petitioned for counseling were reconciled
and ninety percent of these couples were still living together one year later. Catholic Con-
ference Testimony, supra note 89, at 7.
122. See Honest Ground, supra note 109, at 167 n.4.
123. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 202(b), 1980 Pa. Legis Scrv. 51.
124. Bodenheimer, New Approaches of Psychiatry; Implications for Divorce Reform,
1970 UTAH L. REV. 191, 205 [hereinafter cited as Implications for Divorce Reform].
125. See PA. R. Civ. P. 4018.
126. McLaughlin, Court-Connected Marriage Counseling and Divorce -The New York
Experience, 11 J. FAM. L. 517, 526 (1971).
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into the court system, with the commonwealth assuming the expense,
as has been done in numerous states.127
Finally, it should be noted that the use of the counseling provision
in association with the three-year separation statute will be almost
nonexistent. The longer the parties are apart, the more likely it is
that they would grow accustomed to such an arrangement, thereby de-
creasing the chances of reconciliation. 128 While adoption of a two-year
statutory period might present the same problem, the chances of
reconciliation would increase to some extent with the decrease in the
separation periods. Consequently, while the drafters of the Divorce
Code should be applauded for including a conciliation provision, some
adjustments need to be made before a truly beneficial program can be
presented. Compulsory conciliation combined with a court integrated
system should be sufficient to give real meaning to the commonwealth's
policy of encouraging and effecting reconciliation and settlement of dif-
ferences between spouses.
C. Alimony
Prior to the enactment of the new Divorce Code, it was possible for
a wife, regardless of the length of the marriage, to be left without a
means of support and without the marital abode, as a result of a suc-
cessful divorce action by her spouse in Pennsylvania. This was due to
Pennsylvania's long-standing refusal to award alimony pursuant to a
decree of absolute divorce. '2 Pennsylvania stood alone as the only
state in the nation which adhered to such a policy. The underlying ra-
tionale for this policy was that of equality; all parties should be on the
same basis when the marriage is terminated.1" This policy appears to
make little sense in a state where fault was the only ground for
divorce, for alimony was denied to a guilty as well as an innocent
127. Many states, including Arizona, California, Wisconsin and Utah, have court affili-
ated counseling services. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-381.01 to .21 (1976); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1760-1772 (West 1972 & Supp. 1980); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 247.081 (West Supp.
1979); UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-3-17 (1976).
128. See Honest Ground, supra note 109, at 650 (citing the 1963 REPORT OF NEW
JERSEY SUPREME COURT'S COMMITTEE ON CONCILIATION AND RECONCILIATION).
129. Pennsylvania permitted alimony to be awarded in four situations: during the
pendency of a divorce proceeding, pursuant to a divorce from bed and board, where
respondent is insane or suffers from a serious mental disorder. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, §§
45-48 (Purdon 1955).
130. Hooks v. Hooks, 123 Pa. Super. Ct. 507, 512, 187 A. 245, 247 (1936) ("It is ap-
parent that the legislative policy has been, more and more, to place husband and wife, in
matters of divorce, in the same position, and we are of the opinion that it is the present
legislative intent to put all parties, to whom an absolute divorce is or has been granted,
on the same basis").
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spouse. Nevertheless, Pennsylvania's legislators believed that return-
ing the parties to their single status without ensuing financial obliga-
tions was paramount to any policy which would tend to utilize alimony
as a punitive measure.13' By excluding alimony from its divorce pro-
cedure, Pennsylvania actually encouraged the use of the migratory
divorce techniques. A spouse could obtain a divorce rather quickly and
avoid all financial obligations to his family upon his return. This in-
variably would lead to an increase in the state's taxes, since a large
number of these dependents must receive public welfare.
With the application of the new Divorce Code, these problems
should be alleviated. The policy of this commonwealth will shift from
one of equality of the parties after dissolution to an attempt to effec-
tuate economic justice between the spouses. 3 ' Even where one spouse
obtains a migratory divorce, the new Code allows the remaining
spouse to petition the court for alimony; upon a showing of need, if the
other spouse is present in the state or if his property is present, the
court may grant alimony."3 Not only are the dependent spouse and
children protected, but this alimony provision may actually be a deter-
rent to divorce since the spouse must now pay the price for his action.
Under the new Code, a court may allow alimony if the party seeking
it lacks sufficient property and is unable to support himself through
employment. 4 Alimony will not be automatic, for the statute sets
forth fourteen factors to be considered, not only in determining
whether alimony should be granted but also in determining the nature,
amount and duration of the payments. These factors include the earn-
ing power and ages of the parties, as well as the relative needs of the
parties and marital misconduct. 3 ' By inserting these factors into the
131. In actuality, the harshness of the no alimony rule was circumvented to some ex-
tent by the fact that in most divorce cases a settlement agreement would be negotiated
and executed, and then the case would proceed, uncontested, ending with a decree.
However, there was no judicial method to force the spouse to pay, and upon default, the
other spouse had to commence a contract action to obtain the money. Recovery of the
money was hampered by the fact that Pennsylvania's Civil Procedural Support Law
specifically excludes attachment of a defaulting spouse's wages in such a situation. See
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 62, § 2043.39 (Purdon 1968). If one party obtained a migratory divorce,
however, Pennsylvania was required to honor the divorce and the wife was effectively left
to support herself since in these situations a settlement agreement most often was not
even considered.
132. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 102(a)(6), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 50.
133. Id. § 505.
134. Id. § 501(a)(1), (2).
135. Section § 501(b) states:
In determining whether alimony is necessary, and in determining the nature, amount,
duration, and manner of payment of alimony, the court shall consider all relevant factors
including:
(1) The relative earnings and earning capacities of the parties.
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Divorce Code, the drafters have specifically attempted to guide the
judges to an equitable alimony award. However, the purpose of the
alimony award is rehabilitative; that is, payments will be made for a
reasonable time so as to allow the party seeking them to meet his or
her needs by obtaining employment or acquiring appropriate
employable skills." In conflict with this function of alimony is the re-
quirement that the judge consider the marital fault of the parties. 7
(2) The ages, and the physical, mental and emotional conditions of the par-
ties.
(3) The sources of income of both parties including but not limited to
medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(4) The expectancies and inheritances of the parties.
(5) The duration of the marriage.
(6) The contribution by one party to the education, training or increased
earning power of the other party.
(7) The extent to which it would be inappropriate for a party, because said
party will be custodian of minor child, to seek employment outside the home.
(8) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(9) The relative education of the parties and the time necessary to acquire
sufficient education or training to enable the party seeking alimony to find ap-
propriate employment.
(10) The relative assets and liabilities of the parties.
(11) The property brought to the marriage by either party.
(12) The contribution of a spouse as a homemaker.
(13) The relative needs of the parties.
(14) The marital misconduct of either of the parties during the marriage;
however, the marital misconduct of either of the parties during separation
subsequent to the filing of a divorce complaint shall not be considered by the
court in its determinations relative to alimony.
Id. § 501(b).
136. Id § 501(a)(1), (2), (b)(9). See also Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853
(Mo. 1977). In Brueggemann the court, interpreting an alimony statute similar to § 501,
stated:
To logically proceed under the statute, the trial judge must make a threshold deter-
mination of the reasonable needs of the spouse seeking maintenance. Only then can
the judge know whether any maintenance is necessary. The difficulty is that the
statute seemingly offers no guidance to the trial judge in making this determina-
tion. In our opinion the term "reasonable needs" must be defined in terms of the
policies embodied in the new dissolution law.
Id. at 856. The court went on to find that it may be possible in some situations, where the
homemaking spouse has been away from the job market for a long period of time, to put
greater emphasis on the standard of living during the marriage and the duration of the
marriage rather than the rehabilitative aspect.
137. As of 1978, sixteen states specifically excluded marital fault from alimony, twelve
considered it a discretionary factor, and ten made it an automatic bar to an award. The
remaining states made no mention of it in their alimony statute. See Freed & Foster,
supra note 84, at 114. The argument for inclusion of the fault criteria is that a guilty
spouse should not be able to destroy the marriage and then obtain support from the inno-
cent spouse. Additionally, since the alimony hearing is separate and apart from the
divorce proceeding itself, the commonwealth can still adhere to no-fault divorce while
1980
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While the courts of other jurisdictions which have a similar fault provi-
sion have stated that alimony awards are not to be considered as
punishment for the spouse at fault," this might be easier said than
done in Pennsylvania, where fault has governed divorce thinking for
almost two hundred years. Many judges may concentrate more on the
fault asserted than upon the financial needs of the parties. Moreover,
sympathy and undue generosity for the wronged party may very well
be the result of admitting fault evidence.139 Another problem with this
fault finding requirement is that the Code leaves unanswered the ques-
tion of whether the marital misconduct could ever reach a level that
would bar alimony altogether. Although such a conclusion could be
reached under the new Code,"' it would appear to be inconsistent with
the idea of rehabilitative alimony. Not only could the spouse be left
without any funds to enable her to ease back into the work force but if
the purpose of the alimony chapter in the Code is to effectuate
economic justice between the parties so as to allow a clean break from
the marriage in a financially agreeable way, such a result would not
fulfill these purposes. Therefore, it is unfortunate that marital miscon-
duct was included in the new Code as a factor for the judges to con-
sider in determining the alimony award.
allowing it in alimony. The argument against considering fault is that because the
divorce laws in most states now include no-fault provisions, the state is no longer an in-
terested third party and therefore alimony should be considered not as punishment, but,
rather, solely as a social welfare mechanism. Also, since the state has only a formalistic
role in the divorce proceeding and its involvement in the marriage contract has been ter-
minated upon divorce, alimony is awarded as a duty which attached to the spouses at the
time the marriage contract was entered into. Therefore, since the legislature has deter-
mined that fault should not apply to the divorce, this would also include the duty of
alimony which attached prior to the divorce. Finally, it has been postulated that by con-
sidering fault in alimony, the bitterness and hatred that was avoided by implementing no
fault divorce comes in through the back door. See No-Fault Alimony, supra note 43, at
496-97.
138. Tobey v. Tobey, 165 Conn. 742, 345 A.2d 21 (1974); Meyer v. Meyer, 394 A.2d
1220 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Jacobs v. Jacobs, 254 S.E.2d 56 (Va. 1979).
139. Note, The Economics of Divorce: Alimony and Property Awards, 43 U. CIN. L.
REv. 133, 144 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Economics of Divorce].
140. In Maryland, while alimony can be awarded to either spouse, the factors upon
which judges rely in determining alimony awards have been judicially expounded. The
factors which are to be considered are the circumstances of the parties, their station in
life, their age and physical condition, ability to work, duration of the marriage, cir-
cumstances leading to divorce, and fault which destroyed the marriage. Moore v. Moore,
36 Md. App. 696, 375 A.2d 37 (1977). The court in Moore held that "when the actions of
the party seeking alimony are the sole cause of the destruction of the marriage, and the
wrongdoing consists of acts so serious that they can constitute grounds for an absolute
divorce, alimony must be denied unless there are extremely extenuating circumstances."
Id. at 699, 375 A.2d at 40. See also Rhoad v. Rhoad, 273 Md. 459, 330 A.2d 192 (1975);
Flanagan v. Flanagan, 270 Md. 335, 311 A.2d 407 (1973).
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Notwithstanding the fact that marital misconduct will be considered,
the idea of rehabilitative alimony is an admirable one. While the Code
permits the judges to fix the duration of the award generally, alimony
will not be permanent but will last only until the recipient obtains ap-
propriate employment or develops an appropriate employable skill, in
the absence of extraordinary circumstances.1 This will have the effect
of requiring the judges to focus upon the individual's needs, and
therefore supports the argument that fault criteria should not be
considered when awarding alimony. The defendant spouse is forced to
become self-supportive'42 and the payor spouse is not permanently
shackled with a financial obligation. Additionally, the bitterness which
may exist between the parties can only amplify when continuous
monthly alimony payments must be made." ' Rehabilitative alimony will
not prolong such bitterness. Finally, this provision may act as a deter-
rent to those spouses who are willing to easily "give up" on their mar-
riage because of an expectation of permanent support.
For those ex-spouses who attempt to improve their financial situa-
tion without rehabilitating themselves, by cohabitating, the Divorce
Code poses a significant obstacle. While an ex-spouse's cohabitating
with a person of the opposite sex has troubled other states,"' Penn-
sylvania makes it an absolute bar to an alimony award. Until this
point, the alimony chapter in the Divorce Code had been drafted with
almost precise clarity, but here the legislature fell far short of that
mark. Although a petitioner for an alimony award will be barred from
such award where he or she "has entered into cohabitation with a per-
141. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 501(c), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 58. This section must
be coupled with section 501(b)(9) which states that the court must take into consideration
the time necessary to acquire sufficient education or training to find appropriate employ-
ment. Id. § 501(b)(9). Even where a party has a college degree, § 501(b)(9) may still come
into play. An Illinois Appellate Court has upheld a grant of $500 per month to a wife, who
had an undergraduate degree in zoology, to obtain a graduate degree in library science.
The court considered the fact that the wife had never worked in the field of zoology and
had not held any substantial employment since her marriage. Since the opportunities
were better for her in the field of library science and the husband was well able to pay
the $500 per month, the court upheld the award. In re Marriage of Marsh, 64 Ill. App. 3d
572, 381 N.E.2d 804 (1978). However, educational goals will not always mandate a contin-
uance of alimony. Lumsden v. Lumsden, 603 P.2d 564 (Hawaii 1979).
142. See Brueggemann v. Brueggemann, 551 S.W.2d 853 (Mo. 1977), where the court
stated that the new divorce law imposed an affirmative obligation on the party petitioning
for alimony payments to seek employment.
143. Economics of Divorce, supra note 139, at 59.
144. Since many alimony statutes enacted within the last ten years provided that
alimony was to cease upon the death or remarriage of the recipient, the problem arose
where the recipient did not remarry, but instead began to cohabit with a person of the op-
posite sex, a development not addressed by the statutes.
1980 905
Duquesne Law Review
son of the opposite sex,"' 5 nowhere in the Code is cohabitation defined.
Apparently, the legislators presupposed that there could be but one
type of cohabitation. However, some parties may cohabit for a short
period of time with no pooling of assets and with retention of different
surnames, while others may cohabit for a long time under the same
surname and with a pooling of assets, thus establishing a de facto mar-
riage.' 8 The consequences for alimony payment should differ in each
case, but the Divorce Code does not acknowledge such a distinction.'47
If the support needs of the cohabiting ex-spouse are considered, the
first situation would in some instances require that alimony still be
paid, while in the second situation, alimony should properly be ter-
minated.
The present statute should be amended to include a more equitable
provision, perhaps creating a rebuttable presumption that the ex-
spouse is being supported by his or her cohabitant.' 8 Another ap-
proach suggests that if the two cohabitants have lived together for a suf-
ficient amount of time and their combined income is equitably high
enough, or if a de facto marriage exists, then the alimony payments
should be suspended in the former case and terminated in the latter.4 '
145. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 507, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 60. While the language
of § 507 is a bit obscure, it presumably covers both the situation in which the spouse is
cohabiting at the time of the divorce and alimony proceeding, and the case in which the
spouse decides to cohabit after receiving alimony for an extended period of time. If the
legislature did not intend to cover the latter situation, then the wording of § 501(e) should
be amended to encompass it, unless it is found to be a change in circumstances which per-
mits modification.
146. Oldham, The Effect of Unmarried Cohabitation By A Former Spouse Upon His
or Her Right to Continue to Receive Alimony, 17 J. FAM. L. 249, 252 (1978-79) [hereinafter
cited as Unmarried Cohabitation). For cases where the ex-spouse was deemed to be
cohabiting, see Ivey v. Ivey, 378 So.2d 1151 (Ala. Ct. App. 1979); Parish v. Parish, 374
So.2d 348 (Ala. Ct. App. 1979); Taake v. Taake, 75 Wis.2d 115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975). For
cases in which courts have concluded that no cohabitation existed, even though the ex-
spouse was residing with a member of the opposite sex, see Ethridge v. Ethridge, 379
So.2d 87 (Ala. Ct. App. 1979); In re Bramson, 6 Fam. L. Rep. 2486 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980).
147. As recognized by one commentator, this is probably "the result of both moral
outrage at the cohabiting ex-spouse and the misguided belief that the other cohabitant
will always support the ex-spouse." Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 146, at 254. That
same commentator also posits that "[sluch a view could also stem from a belief that a sup-
port obligation should automatically stem from any unmarried cohabitation, regardless
whether a quasi-marital commitment is contemplated. This view is not consistent with the
expectation of a significant number of unmarried cohabitants." Id. at 254 n.23.
148. Such a statute has been enacted in California. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801.5 (West
Supp. 1978). This statute has been criticized as discouraging marriage, and encouraging
cohabitatants to structure their expense so as to cohabit indefinitely.
149. Unmarried Cohabitation, supra note 146, at 266-67 ("After the alimony recipient
has cohabitated for a significant length of time, however, the equities may change; it may
be more equitable to require the cohabitant, rather than the alimony payor, to support
the ex-spouse, even if the cohabitant does not desire to do so").
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Regardless of the approach utilized, either would be far more equitable
in dealing with the problem of cohabitation than the provision presently
included.
Another situation which the Divorce Code fails to consider is that in
which the ex-spouse cohabits, but the cohabitation ends before she is
self-supporting. Again, the nature of the cohabitation should be ex-
amined. If a de facto marriage exists, then alimony should not be
resumed, since it is the equivalent of remarriage itself, with its ensu-
ing obligations. A strong argument has been made that in such a situa-
tion, the cohabitant should assume support payments.1" Where a de
facto marriage is not established it makes even less sense to terminate
alimony payments forever, since the parties' expectations probably
were not to have the financial obligations accompanying marriage at-
tach. Most courts that have considered this "less than de facto" mar-
riage situation have permitted alimony to resume after cohabitation
has ceased.' By allowing cohabitation to bar or at least to terminate
alimony in all cases, the commonwealth in fact turns away from the
major concern of rehabilitative alimony -need -apparently preferring
to allow its disdain for the relationship to obscure its vision.
D. Equitable Distribution of Marital Property
Under the common-law title standard of distribution, which was
utilized in Pennsylvania prior to the passage of the new Divorce Code,
each spouse was permitted to keep any property owned in his or her
own name at the time of divorce.' Property held by the parties as
tenants by the entireties was subject to division in equal one-half
shares, since the divorce had the effect of making the spouses tenants-
in-common." The inequities present under this system are patently ob-
vious. The new Divorce Code effectively deals with these inequalities
by restructuring the entire system of property distribution in Penn-
sylvania.
150. See Note, Beyond Marvin: A Proposal for Quasi-Spousal Support, 30 STAN. L.
REV. 359 (1978). where the author proposes that while the notions of express agreements,
implied contracts and quasi-contract could be utilized, they all have problems associated
with them. A proposed solution is that a presumption of an agreement for quasi-spousal
support arise, placing the burden on the de facto spouse to disprove cohabitation, when
the state has found a de facto marriage to exist.
151. See CAL. CIV. CODE. § 4801.5(c) (West Supp. 1978). See also Garlinger v. Gar-
linger, 137 N.J. Super. Ct. 56, 347 A.2d 799 (App. Div. 1975); Taake v. Taake, 75 Wis. 2d
115, 233 N.W.2d 449 (1975).
152. However if a property agreement has been entered into pending or prior to the
divorce action, the courts will uphold the allocation of property as long as it is fair, free
from fraud and not promotive of divorce. See Droz v. Droz, 39 D. & C.2d 505 (1965).
153. Shoup v. Shoup, 469 Pa. 165, 364 A.2d 1319 (1976).
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Section 401(d) mandates that upon request of one of the spouses, the
court shall equitably distribute or assign the marital property. Thus,
the strict common-law title standard has been rejected. To aid the
court in ascertaining what an equitable distribution will be in any
given situation, the drafters of the Divorce Code have set forth ten
relevant factors for consideration.154 While most states that follow an
equitable distribution theory have similar factors to be considered,
Pennsylvania includes two relatively modern considerations: the con-
tribution of one spouse to the education of the other and the contribu-
tion of one spouse as homemaker.'55
The drafters, in enacting the first of these two provisions, have at-
tempted to alleviate the situation where one spouse, who has worked
to put the other through a professional school, is left with nothing to
show for the effort after the divorce. While the working spouse will be
protected when there are numerous assets at the time of divorce, the
provision seems inadequate to cover the situation where the marriage
is of short duration, and few assets have been accumulated. 5 ' Since the
154. Section 401(d) provides as follows:
In a proceeding for divorce or annulment, the court shall, upon request of either
party, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the par-
ties without regard to marital misconduct in such proportions as the court deems
just after considering all relevant factors including:
(1) The length of the marriage.
(2) Any prior marriage of either party.
(3) The age, health, station, amount and source of income, vocational skills,
employability, estate, liabilities and needs of each of the parties.
(4) The contribution by one party to the education, training, or increased
earning power of the other party.
(5) The opportunity of each party for future acquisitions of capital assets
and income.
(6) The sources of income of both parties, including but not limited to
medical, retirement, insurance or other benefits.
(7) The contribution or dissipation of each party in the acquisition, preserva-
tion, depreciation or appreciation of the marital property, including the contribu-
tion of a party as homemaker.
(8) The value of the property set apart to each party.
(9) The standard of living of the parties established during the marriage.
(10) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of
property is to become effective.
Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 401(d), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 56.
155. Id. § 401(d)(4), (7).
156. See In re Marriage of Graham, 194 Colo. 429, 574 P.2d 75 (1978) (court concluded
that a working wife, who contributed seventy percent of the financial support of the fam-
ily while her husband obtained an M.B.A., did not have a property right in the education
and, because there were no marital assets accumulated, she was entitled to no property
on dissolution of the marriage). However, a working spouse could be protected by the
alimony provision, which requires the court to look to contribution made to education. See
Johnson v. Johnson, 78 Wis. 2d 137, 254 N.W.2d 198 (1977), where the court stated that
1980 Divorce Reform 909
non-student had been employed, her chance for alimony is somewhat
limited. Yet, the working spouse expended efforts in expectation of
future benefits only to receive nothing upon the termination of the
marriage. Such a situation could be avoided if either the education or
the future earnings were characterized as a divisible asset.'57 Periodic
payments similar to alimony could be utilized so as to avoid over-
burdening the student spouse or permitting undue speculation.'
By including the homemaker provision, the legislature has evidenced
its receptiveness to the growing sensitivities connected with women's
rights.159 However, it appears that the courts will initially encounter
certain evidentiary problems in determining what value to place on
homemaker services. It is unclear whether it is to be considered equal
to the income contributed to the household by the other spouse or only
a percentage of that income.' Nevertheless, it is a necessary provision
if an equitable distribution is to be accomplished.
In distributing the marital property, the courts are prohibited from
considering marital misconduct.'' The statute does provide,' however,
that the court may consider the contribution or dissipation in the value
of the marital property by each party. It thus appears that fault
while alimony, property division and support awards may all be distinct awards, they can-
not be made in a vacuum; the property division will affect the needs of the spouses and
therefore the amount of the other awards.
157. Comment, Professional Education as a Divisible Asset in Marriage Dissolutions,
64 IOWA L. REV. 705, 713 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Professional Education]. See also In
re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978).
158. Professional Education, supra note 157, at 716-19. The author suggests that con-
tributions made by one spouse to the education of the other could be analogized to the
concept of loans and investments. As the student spouse prospers in the future the non-
student spouse could apply to the court for an increase due to changed circumstances.
However, this theory conflicts not only with no-fault concepts, which promote a total
break from the marriage situation, but also with the idea of rehabilitative alimony which
anticipates that after a certain time the payor spouse would be freed from the ensuing
financial obligations of the marriage.
159. Actually, the statute is seen as a codification of evolving case law in this area.
See, e.g., Diflorido v. Diflorido, 459 Pa. 641, 331 A.2d 174 (1975) (court overruled prior
common-law precedent and held that to distribute property according to who purchased it
would fail to acknowledge the equally important non-monetary contribution of either
spouse).
160. See Wilberscheid v. Wilberscheid, 77 Wis. 2d 40, 252 N.W.2d 76 (1977) (contribu-
tion of a full-time homemaker may be considered "greater than or at least as great as" the
contribution of the working spouse upon the division of marital property).
161. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 401(d), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 56. Note, however,
that marital misconduct is considered in determining the alimony award. See notes
135-140 and accompanying text supra.
162. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 401(d)(7), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 56.
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evidence will come in through the back door."3 One commentator'" has
stated that consideration of contribution or dissipation by the parties
is inconsistent with the concepts of no-fault, which reflect an unwill-
ingness to dissect the marital relationship. Therefore, a better resolu-
tion of the issue would have been to recognize the presumption that
there is equal contribution and dissipation of assets. ' This method
would fulfill the purpose of equitable distribution more completely.
The property to be excluded from distribution is expressly delineated
in the Code.166 The seven categories deal basically with property of an
individual and personal nature acquired either before the marriage or
during the separation period. Gifts, devises, bequests and certain
veteran's benefits are also excluded even if acquired during the mar-
riage. While this section appears to exclude most property which
should not be considered "marital property," there is no section ex-
cluding personal injury recoveries.167 Apparently, the legislators were
satisfied that a personal injury recovery constituted marital property.
At first glance this may appear to be a basic flaw in the new Code, but
in reality it is only a partial defect.
It is possible for the damages to be considered as a two-part
recovery; an amount for the injury to the person, and an amount for
the injury to the marital entity."' That part of the recovery which
represents income that would have been acquired had the injury not
occurred belongs to the marriage and should be subject to distribution,
while the money that compensated the spouse for his pain "and physical
injuries is personal to him and he should be allowed to keep this as his
163. The result arguably would be different if, while the marriage was still viable, the
husband invested significant amounts of money with the expectation of making a profit
but instead lost the money, as opposed to the situation in which a husband squandered
the money intentionally to keep it from his spouse.
164. Hill & Stogel, supra note 71, at 375.
165. Since § 401(e)(5) protects a spouse from the fraudulent conveyances by the other
spouse prior to the actual divorce proceedings, this suggestion appears all the more ap-
pealing. See Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, § 401(e)(5), 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 56.
166. Id. § 401(e).
167. An earlier draft of the new Divorce Code contained a section which arguably
could cover such personal injury damages. H.B. 640, Pa. Legis., 1979 Sess., § 401(e)(6). That
section included in marital property: "Property acquired with, or received in exchange
for property acquired with, funds derived from compensation, pensions, income, or other
payments received as payment for the loss or impairment of parts or functions of the
body of the party who received the payment." Id. At first glance the section appeared to
be concerned with disability payments, veterans payments or workmen's compensation,
since the drafters chose to use the word "payment" rather than "recovery." Considering
the purpose of the statute, however, it seems reasonable that personal injury recoveries
could have been included. This section was deleted by the Senate before the final draft of
the new Divorce Code was passed.
168. See 41 Mo. L. REV. 603 (1976).
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separate property."9 While such a two-part characterization of the
recovery may be difficult to accomplish, this difficulty is not insur-
mountable. Therefore, it is suggested that an applicable section be added
to the Divorce Code to include only that portion of the recovery which
is personal to the injured party, reserving the remainder of the
recovery to be subject to distribution.
With the enactment of the new Divorce Code, equitable distribution
of property upon termination of marriage has become a reality. Not only
will one spouse not be deprived of his or her fair share, but the Code
also provides for enforcment of a distribution decree. 7' The courts are
provided with sufficient operational standards to guide them in their
decision, and the added requirement that the reasons for the distribu-
tion be expressed in writing 7' provides added security against arbi-
trary rulings.
V. CONCLUSION
Divorce is a concept which has confronted many societies over the
years. Historically, the law in this area seems to have adopted a cir-
cular pattern.'72 The strict family mores of early Rome, which made
divorce quite rare, gave way to almost limitless divorce after the fall
of the Roman Empire . 7 During the Middle Ages, divorce again became
a rare occurrence due to the strong influence of Christianity, which
made divorce based upon marital fault the only divorce available."' To-
day, the trend of the law is toward a more realistic view of the mar-
riage and away from the traditional notions which have grown around
the marital relationship.7 5
Pennsylvania, by recently enacting a new Divorce Code, has joined
the vast majority of states that have broken away from the traditional
notions by enacting no-fault divorce provisions. However, Pennsylvania
has not gone far enough, and will continue to be plagued by many of
the problems associated with the prior divorce law. Specifically, the
commonwealth has retained the former fault grounds of divorce, thus
encouraging the parties to a divorce based upon the fault grounds to
continue to perjure themselves, and permitting the judicial system to
169. Id. at 607.
170. Act of April 2, 1980, No. 26, §§ 401(b), 403, 1980 Pa. Legis. Serv. 55-57.
171. Id. § 403(d).
172. Bodenheimer, Reflections on the Future of the Grounds for Divorce, 8 J. FAM. L.
179, 185 (1968).
173. Id.
174. No-Fault Concept, supra note 40, at 960.
175. See generally Freed & Foster, note 84 supra.
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continue to condone that perjury.'76 Reconciliation will continue to be
difficult under a system in which one spouse must fix the blame for the
deterioration of the marriage on the other. Furthermore, by retaining
the fault grounds the commonwealth is apparently unwilling to recog-
nize the fact that the destruction of a marriage is seldom the fault of
only one of the spouses.
7
However, by the inclusion of the no-fault grounds, the legislators
have taken a substantial step in the right direction. Where both
spouses agree that the marriage is irretrievably broken, terminating
the dead marriage is much more preferable than prolonging the bit-
terness between the two spouses, with possible adverse effects upon
the children.17' Even where one party disagrees that the marriage is
dead, a separation period of three years would surely seem to be
substantial objective proof that a viable marriage no longer exists.
Yet, Pennsylvania refuses to go this far, and the unilateral provision
will probably be of little practical value because of the long period of
separation and the necessity for a court determination of whether the
marriage is irretrievably broken at the end of the period.7
The counseling provisions are a necessary ingredient if the mutual
consent no-fault ground is to work effectively. Since many people who
petition for a divorce may not really want one, but consider it the only
possible solution,8 ° counseling should serve to preserve many mar-
riages. Its utility when dealing with the grounds of indignities and the
three-year separation will be much less, since either an accusatory
stage is set or the parties will be more amenable to separate lifestyles.
However, two problems can lead to the failure of the counseling provi-
sion even when dealing with the mutual consent ground: first the par-
ticipation by both spouses is not mandatory, and second, the counseling
is not court-affiliated, a fact which could make counseling unavailable
to the poor. Nevertheless, the counseling provisions make the policy of
the commonwealth to preserve the family unit more than mere idle
words.
Finally, the new provisions dealing with alimony and equitable
distribution were desperately needed, and will significantly alleviate
the economic problems associated with divorce. The fact that one
spouse might now be financially obligated to the other should drastically
reduce the occurrence of the "migratory divorce."'' Additionally,
176. See notes 64-66 and accompanying text supra.
177. See notes 41-43 and accompanying text supra.
178. See Baum, A Trial Judge's Random Reflections on Divorce: The Social Problem
and What Lawyers Can Do About It, 11 WAYNE L. REV. 451, 452-53 (1965).
179. See notes 108-115 and accompanying text supra.
180. Implications for Divorce Reform, supra note 124, at 198-99.
181. See notes 58-59 and accompanying text supra.
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because the alimony in most cases will not be of a permanent nature,
the parties can escape the dead marriage and will not be continually
shackled with alimony payments. Adding in the fight to obtain an
equitable dissolution of the marriage is the fact that courts will now
look seriously at the needs of both parties when distributing the
marital property. While extensive factors are listed in both areas as a
check on the judicial discretion, there do exist a few unresolved
issues."' In the long run, however, both sections should prove quite
beneficial to Pennsylvania's system of family law.
It appears that divorce will always be part of our culture. Efforts
have been proposed to stop the rising divorce rate, but most have
proved to be either impracticable or unworkable.18 Idealistically,
divorce should not be necessary in society at all. If the biblical admoni-
tion that "What therefore God has put together, let not man put
asunder" played a more substantial role in the decision of a man and
woman to marry, perhaps more thought would be given to that deci-
sion, and to the state of life to which parties to a marriage commit
themselves. The rising divorce rate in modern society evidences the
unfortunate lack of serious commitment which many couples bring to
the marital relationship. In view of the increasing number of marriages
that end in bitterness, ill feeling, dissatisfaction, or simple "falling out
of love," it is not surprising that most states have reexamined their
divorce laws and have incorporated provisions more consistent with
modern perceptions of the institution of marriage. Prior to July 1,
1980, Pennsylvania adhered to an antiquated and often hypocritical ac-
cusatory system, in which a divorce was unavailable unless there was a
finding of "fault" on the part of one of the parties to the marriage. The
passage of the new Divorce Code will not alleviate all of the problems
associated with the fault system, but it is a significant improvement
over the old system. The new Code will permit marriages to be ter-
minated with a minimal amount of pain and bitterness, and will also
aid the parties toward achieving a smooth transition to life on their
own. Unfortunately, the new Code is not a panacea for all of the prob-
lems which relate to the institution of marriage in modern society.
182. See notes 154-173 and accompanying text supra.
183. No Fault Concept supra note 40, at 970-71. This study posits two alternatives.
First, the use of a "trial marriage" is suggested, in which the parties would contract to be
married for a trial period and if at the end of that period no children were born, the par-
ties would be free to rescind the contract. If children were born, the contract would
automatically be permanently ratified. Second, the study suggests that there should be
strongly enforced age requirements before marriage is permitted, coupled with an educa-
tional waiting period, The conclusion is that society is probably not ready to accept the
first alternative and would reject the second as too restrictive. Id.
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While the legislature may attempt to alleviate the problems associated
with the termination of dead marriages, it apparently is powerless to
deal with the more deeply rooted sociological problems which may
cause a marriage to die.
Michael F. Nestor
